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The transatlantic slave trade from West Africa involved the enforced 
migration of over 6.3 million people between the middle of the sixteenth 
century and the middle of the nineteenth century.1 The involvement of 
Africans in this slave trade was complex. They were victims on the one 
hand, wrenched from their homes through violence and forcibly moved 
over great distances to uncertain destinations. Many enslaved Africans never 
left the continent – how many is not known. Besides them, millions were 
sent to the Americas or crossed the Sahara. On the other hand, Africans 
also enabled the slave trade. A highly sophisticated commercial network 
made the movement of population possible through trade. Without the 
activities of African merchants this trade could not have taken place. As 
agents of the slave trade, merchants were responsible for distributing the 
slaves that were produced by a political structure that was enslaving people. 
It is difficult to separate these various overlapping elements of the slave 
trade. However, there is no question that African agency was an essential 
component of the transatlantic trade. 
The involvement of governments and commercial networks 
inevitably meant that the trade was regulated and resulted in government 
intervention in this enforced population displacement. How effective such 
intervention was can be gleaned by a comparison of two distinct and 
separate parts of Africa that fed significant numbers of enslaved Africans 
into the Atlantic trade. There was considerable variation in the organization 
and regulation of the migration of slaves and specifically the extent to which 
African governments and commercial enterprises facilitated migration or 
otherwise restricted or regulated the slave trade. The economics of supply 
and demand ultimately motivated this commercialized population 
displacement.  
                                                 
1 The research on the Bight of Biafra has been done in collaboration with David 
Richardson, as revealed in the notes, but the comparisons made here are my own 
responsibility. The estimates of the transatlantic slave trade are derived from the 
expanded Voyage Database of David Eltis, Manolo Florentino, David Richardson, 
and Stephen Behrendt, Emory University. I am grateful for permission to cite the 
database.  




The patterns in regulation and collaboration reveal the extent to which 
African governments and merchants responded to external, transatlantic, 
demand for captive labour. It is argued here that areas under Muslim 
influence attempted to restrict the flow of enslaved populations to the 
Atlantic coast for shipment to the Americas. These attempts were reflected 
in the prices paid for slaves, with Europeans apparently willing to pay 
relatively more for males on the coast than Muslim traders were willing to 
pay in the interior. The intention here is to examine the political and 
ideological factors that underpinned the price differential between the 
interior and the coast and the seeming unwillingness of Muslim merchants 
to sell slaves into the transatlantic trade. By contrast the states and societies 
along the West African coast, and especially in the Bight of Biafra, 
participated freely in the transatlantic slave trade and were centrally involved 
in the deportation of enslaved Africans. A comparison between areas of 
Muslim influence in the interior of West Africa with the Bight of Biafra 
highlights the contrasting efforts to regulate and thereby limit trade, on the 
one hand, with efforts at regulation that were intended to promote the slave 
trade, on the other hand. An examination of the Bight of Biafra and the 
Muslim interior emphasizes regional variations that have to be taken into 
consideration in studying the degree to which governments and merchant 




Origins of slaves in West Africa 
 
The areas of West Africa from which the enslaved population came 
included the areas of Senegambia and the upper Guinea coast, north of 
present Liberia, where there were a great variety of languages spoken. There 
was a strong and increasingly stronger Islamic influence here, which 
reflected the long tradition of Islam in the interior, where the Songhay 
empire held sway until its collapse in the 1590s. Despite the resulting 
political upheaval, the Islamic tradition continued, and indeed expanded, 
through the operation of extensive commercial networks that stretched to 
the coast. By the eighteenth century, the Muslim presence was complicated 
by the development of a militant reform movement among Muslims that 
led to the outbreak of jihad in Futa Jallon, in the immediate interior of the 
upper Guinea coast and Sierra Leone. Another jihad erupted in the Senegal 
valley, first in Futa Bondu and then in Futa Toro. In the Americas, people 




from this region can be identified quite early on. Material from the 
seventeenth century demonstrates a great variety of ethnic designations 
among slaves, many came from areas immediately on the coast itself but 
some people came from the interior including Muslims, who were usually 
referred to as Mandingo, in a variety of spellings.2 
 
Map 1: West Africa in the 18th Century 
 
A second area from where enslaved Africans came concerned the region of 
the Gold Coast and Bight of Benin, often referred to in Latin America as 
the Mina coast, originally derived from the Portuguese trading castle at 
Elmina (‘the mine’ from the Portuguese name Castelo de São Jorge da 
Mina). This reflected the importance of gold in trade, which came from 
alluvial deposits in the forest region inhabited by the Akan, who constituted 
                                                 
2 Stephan Bühnen, ‘Ethnic origins of Peruvian slaves (1548-1650). Figures for 
Upper Guinea,’ Paiduema 39 (1993) 57-110; Paul E. Lovejoy and Renée Soulodre-La 
France, ‘Nueces de Cola en Cartagena. Intercambios Transatlánticos en el siglo 
XVII’ in: Claudia Mosquera, Mauricio Pardo and Odile Hoffmann eds, 
Afrodescendientes en las América: Trayectorias socials e identitarias (Bogota) 195-212; 
Sylviane Diouf, ‘Devils or sorcerers, Muslims or Studs. Manding in the Americas’ 
in: Paul E. Lovejoy and David V. Trotman eds, Trans-Atlantic dimensions of ethnicity in 
the African Diaspora (London 2003) 139-57; and Gwendlyn Midlo Hall, Databases for 
the study of Louisiana history and genealogy 1719-1820 (Baton Rouge 2000).  
 




several small centralized states and who in the eighteenth century were 
largely consolidated into the kingdom of Asante. Although these states were 
decidedly not Muslim, there was nonetheless Muslim influence through 
trade with the interior and because of the presence of Muslims in Asante, 
especially in the northern provinces conquered in the middle of the 
eighteenth century. In the seventeenth century, this region was a net 
importer of enslaved people, some of whom were brought along the coast 
by European slavers, where slaves were sold for gold. The wars of the first 
half of the eighteenth century, which resulted in the consolidation of 
Asante, reversed this flow and in this period large numbers of enslaved 
people who were captured during the Akan wars were sent to the Americas. 
Many of the enslaved people from the Mina coast came from the 
area east of the Volta River, the most important departure point being the 
beach at Ouidah, which witnessed the export of hundreds of thousands of 
people in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Ouidah was the 
most important port, first for the small kingdom of Huedah, whose capital 
was at Savi, a few kilometres inland. Thereafter it functioned as the principal 
port for the larger kingdom of Allada, centred to the west of Lake Nokoué, 
which was fed by the Weme River and flowed into the sea along the lagoons 
behind the beach, entering the sea at Lagos in the east and Grand Popo in 
the west. As Robin Law has demonstrated, this lagoon system explains the 
location of a series of departure points for slaves in the Bight of Benin, 
from Petite Popo through Ouidah, Porto Novo, Badagry and Lagos.3 The 
point in time at which each of these ports was important to the trade is 
explained by the political history of the region, specifically the rise and fall 
of Allada, Dahomey and Oyo. In the wars and campaigns that marked this 
political history, many people were enslaved and sent to the Americas, and 
the overwhelming majority of these people spoke one or more of the Gbe 
languages, including Ewe, Fon, Allada, and Mahi.4 It should be noted, 
                                                 
3 Robin Law, ‘Between the sea and lagoons. The interaction of maritime and inland 
navigation on the pre-colonial slave coast’, Cahiers d’études africaines 29 (1989) 209-
237. 
4 For a discussion of the changing meanings of ‘Mina’, see Gwendolyn Midlo Hall, 
‘African ethnicities and the meanings of “Mina”’ in: Lovejoy and Trotman, Trans-
Atlantic dimensions, 65-81; Paul E. Lovejoy, ‘Ethnic designations of the slave trade 
and the reconstruction of the history of Trans-Atlantic slavery’ in: Lovejoy and 
Trotman, Trans-Atlantic dimensions, 9-42; and Mary Karasch, ‘Guiné, Mina, Angola, 
and Benguela. African and Crioulo nations in central Brazil, 1780-1820’ in: José C. 
Curto and Paul E. Lovejoy eds, Enslaving connections. Changing cultures of Africa and 




further, that wars in the Akan interior and in the Gbe region overlapped 
and effectively formed a continuous and contiguous power struggle, with 
the dominance of Asante in the west, Dahomey in the centre, and Oyo in 
the eastern portions of this broad region.  
The final area of West Africa from where a sizeable number of 
people came was the Bight of Biafra and especially the ports of Elem 
Kalabari in the Niger delta and Old Calabar on the Cross River in the 
seventeenth century, and from Bonny in the Niger delta in the eighteenth 
century. All three ports had a common interior, connected by a river, which 
was settled principally by Igbo and Ibibio speaking peoples. While some 
people from this region were brought to Latin America in the seventeenth 
century, if not earlier still, most came in the eighteenth century, often 
indirectly in English ships via Jamaica or Barbados, and from there to Vera 
Cruz, Cartegena, Portobello and then onward. The region of the interior of 
the Bight of Biafra was different from the areas further west in two 
important respects. First, there was no Muslim presence, as far as known, 
and secondly, there were no major centralized states in the area. Trade and 
society were rather organized through male secret societies that provided a 
network connecting the major ports with the commercial network of the 
interior.5 
For reasons that are not clear, large areas of West Africa remained 
beyond the pull of the transatlantic slave trade, a pattern that should not be 
overlooked in studying the movement of people across the Atlantic and the 
corresponding impact on West Africa. Hence the region between Oyo and 
the lower Niger River, including the Kingdom of Benin, was not heavily 
involved in the slave trade to the coast in the seventeenth or eighteenth 
century, although the presence of people identified as ‘Caravali’, ‘Carabali’ 
or ‘Calabar’ suggests that the region was at least marginally involved. The 
heartland of the Igbo and Ibibio region, however, were forcefully pulled 
                                                                                                             
Brazil during the era of slavery (Amherst 2004) 163-186; Olabiyi Yai, ‘Texts of 
enslavement. Fon and Yoruba vocabularies from eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century Brazil’ in: Paul E. Lovejoy ed., Identity in the shadow of slavery (London 2000) 
102-112.  
5 Renée Soulodre-La France, ‘“I, Francisco Castañeda, Negro Esclavo Caravali.” 
Caravali ethnicity in colonial New Granada’ in: Lovejoy and Trotman, Trans-Atlantic 
dimensions, 96-114; Michael A. Gomez, ‘The quality of anguish. The Igbo response 
to enslavement in the Americas’ in: Lovejoy and Trotman, Trans-Atlantic dimensions, 
82-95; and Rina Cáceres Gómez, Negros, mulattos, esclavos y libertos en la Costa Rica del 
siglo XVII (Mexico City 2000). 




into the trade in the course of the eighteenth century. Similarly there were 
many areas near the coast, in what is now Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire, which 
remained largely outside the Atlantic slave trade and when involved at all 
the focus was on points near the mouths of rivers, and then only for 
relatively brief periods. 
 
 
The slave trade and the Muslim interior 
 
Muslim merchants dominated the trade routes of the interior of West 
Africa, while coastal middlemen controlled the port towns of the Atlantic 
coast. Everywhere in West Africa, government officials profited from the 
sale of enslaved people. Many of the enslaved were considered enemies of 
the state. There was a particularly striking contrast between the areas where 
Muslim merchants were involved and the activities of coastal traders in the 
Bight of Biafra and their links with the interior areas. Muslim trade in the 
interior of West Africa was centred on clerical and commercial towns of the 
western Sudan and the Hausa network in central Sudan. Muslim merchants 
traded with many parts of the coast. For example, the Hausa merchant, 
Pierre Tamata, having been educated in France, dominated trade at Porto 
Novo in the early 1790s through his links with the interior, serving as the 
agent for French slavers. There were prohibitions on trade with Christian 
Europeans, and hence to some extent limitations on the export of slaves via 
Muslim networks, where the slave trade was thriving. As a result, there were 
conscious attempts to restrict trade as well to promote it, as reflected in the 
limited trade down the Niger river before the nineteenth century. The slaves 
were channelled into Muslim regions, including by re-export across the 
Sahara, rather than towards the Atlantic coast. 
There was considerable discussion of issues relating to slavery and 
enslavement within West Africa, particularly among Muslim intellectuals, 
over the significance of racial and ethnic categories as factors used to justify 
enslavement, and the importance of Islam in protecting freeborn individuals 
from enslavement. Some argued that Muslims should not be involved in the 
transatlantic slave trade on the basis of religion and the desire to avoid the 
sale of slaves to Christian Europeans. This internal discourse is revealed in 
the writings of Ahmad Bābā (1556-1627) of Timbuktu, whose treatise Mi‘raj 
al-su‘ud (The ladder of ascent towards grasping the law concerning transported blacks) 
was concerned with distinguishing among those people who were known in 
the Islamic world as ‘Sudani’ – blacks or people of the Sudan. He 




specifically refuted arguments that black Africans could be enslaved on 
racial grounds. Only ‘unbelief’ was a legitimate reason for enslavement, for 
this reason his treatise was intended to be an ‘Exposition and explanation 
concerning the varieties of transported blacks’. This establishes the ethnic 
and political basis of identification with religious belief and social status, and 
therefore expresses an indigenous, West African perception of community 
and collective consciousness that is essential in understanding conceptions 
of ethnicity and how these may or may not have changed through limited 
interaction with the transatlantic world. The strong Muslim presence in 
West Africa had an important influence on restricting the sale of slaves to 
Europeans on the coast. As demonstrated elsewhere, West Africa appears 
to have sent fewer slaves to the Americas because of this influence than 
otherwise might have been expected.6 This is not to suggest that Muslims 
were free from enslavement or that they did not engage with Christian 
Europeans for reasons of expediency. Indeed the presence of Muslims in 
the Americas from the earliest days of the transatlantic trade demonstrates 
the complexity of the situation in West Africa at a time when Spain and 
Portugal were consolidating their control of the Iberian peninsular and 
establishing empires beyond the shores of Europe. Moreover the shifting 
alliances among Muslims after the Ottoman conquest of much of North 
Africa sometimes pitted Muslims against Muslims and inevitably resulted in 
the enslavement of free individuals. A consequence of this political situation 
was an outpouring of legal opinion and debate on the legitimacy of 
enslavement and the proper relationship among Muslims, between Muslims 
and Christians, and indeed with others who were not Muslims.  
The legal opinions of Ahmad Bābā both reflected and helped to 
shape the attitudes of Muslim West Africans on the legitimacy of 
enslavement and the permissibility of trading in slaves. In his treatise, 
Ahmad Bābā noted ‘that whoever now comes to you from the group called 
Mossi, or Gurma, or Busa or Borgu or Dagomba or Kotokoli or Yoruba or 
Tunbughu or Bubu [Bobo] or Karmu [?] – all of these are unbelievers, 
remaining in their unbelief until now’, and hence their enslavement was 
legitimate. In one of his replies that elaborated on his treatise, Ahmad Bābā 
                                                 
6 Paul E. Lovejoy, ‘Islam, slavery, and political transformation in West Africa. 
Constraints on the Trans-Atlantic slave trade’, Revue française d’histoire d’outre mer 89 
(2002) 247-282; Paul E. Lovejoy, ‘The context of enslavement in West Africa. 
Ahmad Bābā and the ethics of slavery’ in: Jane Landers ed., Slaves, subjects, and 
subversives. Blacks in colonial Latin America (Albuquerque 2006) 9-38. 




identified those people whom he thought were undisputedly Muslims and 
those he considered non-Muslims, many of whom also had some Muslims 
resident among them. His list of Muslims included numerous, perhaps 
most, of the Mande patronymic clans, and hence his conception of ethnicity 
is also worthy of commentary. 
 While many of the terms that he used have not yet been identified, a 
few ethnic labels were also used in the Americas, thereby suggesting a link 
between the theoretical discussion within West Africa and the enslaved 
population in the Americas. The ethnic terms which were common included 
‘Bambara’, ‘Yoruba’, ‘Mandinke’, ‘Hausa’, ‘Fulbe/Fulani’ and others as well, 
which were clearly carried over into the nomenclature of the transatlantic 
trade. The overlap with European terminology suggests an influence from 
this theoretical discussion whose significance has often been overlooked. 
Various studies in different parts of the Americas have identified the terms 
used for ethnic designations, but without noting the parallel between 
Muslim terminology in some cases and the lack of correspondence in 
others. The extent to which the enslaved carried these distinctions into the 
Diaspora is unclear, but there is considerable evidence that Muslims 
distinguished among themselves on the basis of ethnic categories that 
conformed to Ahmad Bābā’s terminology. 
 During the height of the Atlantic slave trade in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, Islamic schools across western Africa taught the legal 
principles of slavery that derived from Ahmad Bābā and earlier scholars. 
These principles emphasized religious belief and sometimes ethnicity as 
legitimizing slavery. The Qadiriyya brotherhood to which Ahmad Bābā 
belonged operated an educational system that drew on common texts, and 
hence there is no question that his influence was extensive.7 Later scholars 
and reformers, such as the Tuareg cleric, Jibrīl b. ‘Umar, advocated holy war 
(jihad) to protect the free status of Muslims. ‘Uthmān dan Fodio, Jibrīl’s 
student, actually initiated a jihad, and one justification was complaints over 
wrongful enslavement. These reformers were not against slavery as such, 
but rather the enslavement of Muslims, and the influence of Ahmad Bābā is 
clear.8 Hence the majority of enslaved Africans from West Africa who 
                                                 
7 Ivor Wilks, ‘The transmission of Islamic learning in the Western Sudan’ in: J. 
Goody ed., Literacy in traditional societies (Cambridge 1968), 162-97. 
8 The literature is extensive, but see ‘Abdullah ibn Muhammad dan Fodio’s Diyā’ al-
sultān wa ghayrihi min al-ikhwān fī ahamm ma yutlab ‘ilmuhu fī umūr al-zamān (see 
Muhammad Sani Zahradeen, ‘‘Abd Allah ibn Fodio’s contributions to the Fulani 




reached the Americas in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were not 
from Muslim areas, despite the presence of Mandingo and others who can 
be identified as Muslims. The largest number of people came from areas 
very near the coast, or on the coast itself, in areas south of the Muslim 
savannah.  
The relative constraints placed on the transatlantic trade by Muslim 
interpretations of legitimacy seem to have become less effective in the 
eighteenth century. There are two signs of this shift. First, the greatly 
increased demand for slaves in the Americas encouraged those who did not 
share Muslim views of legitimacy, and consequently, it was more difficult 
for Muslim scholars and legal structures to influence the contours of trade. 
Second, the reaction against the perceived illegality of enslaving those who 
were Muslims prompted a militancy that erupted in jihad, initially in the 
Senegambia region, and eventually spreading to the central Sudan by the 
early nineteenth century. In this conflict, there was room for the 
enslavement of Muslims by those who opposed Muslim influence, since the 
non-Muslims involved in the slave trade were not interested in protecting 
the status of Muslims as free persons, and as in the period of Songhay, 
Muslims were enslaved if they opposed jihad. However, the great expansion 
in the numbers of enslaved Africans leaving West Africa, especially in the 
second half of the eighteenth century, was still largely confined to non-
Muslims, including Igbo, Yoruba, Akan, and others. 
However, cultural, political and above all religious factors explain the 
discrepancy in market forces and the relative degree to which merchants 
and officials in western Africa prevented slaves from Muslim areas from 
crossing the Atlantic. It was not because the North African, and even an 
expanding Saharan, market was relatively small by comparison with the 
                                                                                                             
Jihad in nineteenth-century Hausaland’ [Ph.D. diss., McGill University, 1976] 13-
14); Tazyīn al-Waraqāt (Ibadan 1963) and Diyā’ al-Hukkām (see Shehu Yamusa, ‘The 
political ideas of the Jihad leaders. Being a translation, edition and analysis of (1) 
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[master’s thesis, Bayero University Kano, 1975], 270-85); ‘Uthman ibn Muhammad 
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also ‘Abd al-Qādir b. al-Mustafā (d. 1864), Radat al-afkar.  




transatlantic market for slaves, and therefore protected from European 
encroachment, but because the internal West African market in Muslim 
areas was so large. The explanation is to be found in changes in the social 
and political economy of the region, which promoted growth in commerce, 
more specifically, in the consolidation of Muslim states and commercial 
networks that restricted the sale of slaves to the coast for ideological and 
religious reasons. Rather than a division between Sahara and Atlantic, the 
dividing line, to the extent that there was one, was determined politically, 
separating the states of Muslim West Africa from the Atlantic. 
 Despite some variation over time, the gender composition of slave 
trading suggests that there was a Sahara/Atlantic divide that affected prices 
for males and females and determined gender ratios in the sale of males and 
females. In the transatlantic trade, males were valued as much as two to one, 
while females were in greater demand across the Sahara, the demand being 
each the inverse of the other.9 Because of the importance of slavery within 
the societies and economies of West Africa, especially in Muslim areas, the 
apparent differentials in prices between males and females may not have 
been significant, however. While the Atlantic trade paid more for men, the 
apparent differential is misleading, since males in the interior could also be 
ransomed, often at a price that was twice the market price. Hence the value 
of males in the interior was a combination of the recorded market prices 
and the money that could be raised through ransoming.10 When the ransom 
factor is taken into consideration, the price differential between the interior 
and the Atlantic coast and the pull of the Americas appears to have been 
much less than has sometimes been recognized. 
Slavery was a major feature of economy and society in Muslim areas 
of West Africa. During the period of the transatlantic slave trade, many 
slaves were retained within West Africa, especially in Muslim areas, and this 
local demand limited the supply of enslaved individuals for the Atlantic 
trade. Constraints on the sale of slaves to the Atlantic coast were consistent 
with policies that attempted to prevent the sale of slaves to European and 
                                                 
9 See Paul E. Lovejoy, ‘Internal markets or an Atlantic-Sahara divide? How women 
fit into the slave trade of West Africa’ in: Gwyn Campbell, Suzanne Miers and 
Joseph C. Miller eds, Women and slavery (Athens 2007). 
10 The issue is discussed further in Jennifer Loftkranz, ‘The ransoming of enslaved 
Muslims in the Western Sudan in the nineteenth century’, unpublished paper 
presented at the conference, ‘Slavery, Islam and Diaspora’, York University, 
Toronto, October 2003. 




Christian countries. The practice of ransoming freeborn Muslims and 
prohibiting the sale of slaves to non-Muslims helps to explain the apparent 
situation in which a high proportion of slaves were retained internally while 
relatively few were exported to the Atlantic coast. Certainly the practice of 
ransoming was a factor in determining the price of slaves. The price 
differential that placed a premium on females reveals that the pull of the 
transatlantic market was not sufficient to draw slaves to the ports of the 
Atlantic coast from Muslim regions in the interior of West Africa, even 
though in terms of demography and slave marketing, it would have been 
theoretically possible to draw on the enslaved populations of the interior. 
 
 
The slave trade of the Bight of Biafra 
 
In areas beyond Muslim influence along the West African coast, the 
development of the slave trade depended upon a variety of credit 
arrangements between European slave traders and local merchants. Without 
protection for the credit that underpinned trade, European merchants 
would not have extended goods to African middlemen, and the volume of 
trade and the movement of slaves would have been correspondingly 
restricted. While the methods of securing credit varied considerably, the 
focus here is on the Bight of Biafra, whose involvement in the slave trade 
expanded greatly in the course of the eighteenth century.11 The growth in 
trade was almost entirely in the hands of British merchants, especially those 
from Liverpool and to a lesser extent from Bristol, and in the Bight of 
Biafra, in the hands of merchants at two ports, Bonny in the Niger delta and 
Old Calabar on the Cross river. The contrast with the Muslim interior of 
West Africa is striking in other ways. Whereas the Muslim interior had a 
substantial slave population and was itself a major market for slaves and 
                                                 
11 In Angola, the Portuguese established a colony centred at the coastal ports of 
Luanda and Benguela and hence making a distinction between their activities and 
those of ‘African’ states is not simple. In other places, notably on the Gold Coast 
(present Ghana) and also on the upper Guinea coast, European companies 
established ‘factories’ and forts that served as bulking points for slaves and 
warehouses for imported goods. The relationship between these enclaves and local 
states required some recognition of African sovereignty, with fortifications intended 
to protect such establishments from rival European adventurers more than to 
provide security from Africans. 




therefore potentially could have supplied many more slaves to the Atlantic 
world than actually happened, the region of the Bight of Biafra responded 
directly to transatlantic market demand, without the inhibiting influence of 
Islamic policies and sentiments. 
 Four features stand out to explain why the Bight of Biafra became a 
major source of enslaved Africans in the eighteenth century. First, the local 
merchant elite at Bonny and Old Calabar was able to harness resources to 
dominate trade with the interior, and they did so without any European 
residents and without the emergence of a mulatto population, which was to 
be found in almost all other parts of the Atlantic coast of Africa. Second, 
the merchants at Bonny successfully subordinated their interests to central 
authority, which thereby enabled the necessary credit protection for 
commercial expansion. Third, the merchants at Old Calabar regulated trade 
through an association of adult males, known as ekpe, which technically was 
a graded and secret society associated with governance, and including the 
enforcement of debt payments. Merchants were able to secure debts 
through the adaptation of the local practice of pawning people, usually 
relatives, as the collateral for loans, which was also common elsewhere 
along the African coast.12 Finally, the merchants of Bonny and Old Calabar 
were connected with the interior through their links with merchants from 
Aro Chukwu, whose network of markets and trading centres crisscrossed 
the Igbo and Ibibio regions of the interior. This Aro network, which 
expanded in the course of the eighteenth century, was responsible for the 
sale of the great majority of slaves who left the Bight of Biafra for the 
Americas.  
The close association between the merchants of Old Calabar and 
Bonny with their British counterparts stands in stark contrast to the 
distance separating Muslim merchants from the Atlantic trade. The 
merchants of the Bight of Biafra visited Britain and in some cases were 
educated in Liverpool or Bristol. According to abolitionist Thomas 
Clarkson: 
 
On those parts of the coast, which are the greatest markets for 
slaves, many Africans reside, who act as interpreters to the ships. 
                                                 
12 On the use of pawnship as a credit security mechanism in other places, including 
the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, the Windward Coast, Cameroon, Gabon, and the 
Loango Coast, see Paul E. Lovejoy and David Richardson, ‘The business of slaving. 
Pawnship in Western Africa, c. 1600-1810’, Journal of African History 42 (1999) 25-50. 




These, by great industry and perseverance, have made themselves 
masters of two or three of the languages of the country, and of the 
language of those Europeans, with whom they are most connected in 
trade. This capacity of learning, and of conversing in other languages, 
is clearly a proof of the existence of reflection, of a nice 
discrimination, and of such other qualities and powers as are 
ascribeable to human beings alone.13 
 
Since the British dominated trade, Bonny merchants were fluent in English, 
or at least spoke pidgin14, a feature noted by Clarkson:  
 
I must not forget here, that several of the African traders, or great 
men, are not unacquainted with letters. This is particularly the case at 
Bonny and Calabar, where they not only speak the English language 
with fluency, but write it. These traders send letters repeatedly to the 
merchants here [in Britain], stating the situation of the markets, the 
goods which they would wish to be sent out to them the next 
voyage, the number of slaves which they expect to receive by that 
time, and such other particulars, as might be expected from one 
merchant to another. These letters are always legible, void of 
ambiguity, and easy to be understood. They contain of course, 
sufficient arguments to shew, that they are as capable of conducting 
trade, and possess as good an understanding as those to whom they 
write.15 
 
Clarkson was not willing to ‘say that they exhibit marks of an equal 
erudition’, but he suggested that if they were not equal that it was because 
of the slave trade. 
 Bonny achieved a dominant position in trade because slave ships 
could be loaded faster than elsewhere on the coast, and this quick 
turnaround time for ships more than compensated for its reputation. About 
three-quarters of the slaves leaving the Bight of Biafra were loaded at 
Bonny, located at the eastern mouth of the Rio Real in the mangrove 
swamps of the Niger delta and described as that ‘horrid hole’ because it was 
infested by mosquitoes and other disease-carrying insects, and frequently 
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oppressively hot and humid.16 At Bonny, there was almost no land available 
for farming, although salt continued to be produced and fish was a staple of 
local consumption and export into the interior. The town, estimated to have 
25.000 inhabitants, included dependent villages within a few miles radius of 
the principal settlement, and was entirely focused on trade. According to 
Thomas Clarkson, ‘the regularity of the trade, and the small space of time in 
which a cargo may be compleated, are considerations, which have made 
these places more resorted to than any other upon the coast.’17 In 1788, 
James Jones of Bristol claimed that ships trading to Bonny and nearby Elem 
Kalabari purchased slaves ‘much quicker than at any other place.’18 Bonny 
achieved this advantage to load ships quickly and therefore reduce the time 
Liverpool and other ships spent on the African coast through the 
management of large canoes that ferried goods to and slaves from the 
inland fairs and markets dominated by their Aro partners.19  
 The amanyanabo (a military title) of Bonny regulated trade, which was 
one reason for the quick turn around time for ships that became a hallmark 
of the place. The family of Perekule (known to Europeans as ‘Pepple’) 
controlled the title, consolidating their position by acquiring great wealth 
through trade. As early as 1699, the Perekule had achieved political 
hegemony over the community and its trade with the interior, primarily as a 
result of the achievements of a man whom Barbot described as ‘a sharp 
blade, and a mighty talking Black’, ‘a great war leader’ who was able to 
confine succession to his family.20 Concentration of authority was 
subsequently reinforced by controls over oracles and shrines, over the 
prohibition on sexual liaisons with strangers, and over other areas of social 
life. Tradition suggests, furthermore, that Perekule’s accession triggered 
institutional changes that strengthened ideologically the power of the 
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amanyanabo, and thus the Perekule dynasty, while transforming the operation 
of lineage houses, shifting the basis of leadership from descent to military 
prowess and economic ability. The Perekule are alleged even to have 
sanctioned the right of slaves to become heads of houses, thereby 
establishing successful trading units in their own right and absorbing their 
less successful rivals.  
 British trade with Old Calabar involved the adaptation by British and 
Old Calabar merchants of the local institution of pawnship as a way of 
securing credit. Because power was diffused among the dominant families 
of the wards of the community, and as noted above, the ekpe society, served 
as the institution that transcended divisions, settled disputes, and imposed 
sanctions. Ekpe ensured a method of credit protection in international 
exchanges which rested on the appropriation and adaptation of local 
systems of credit protection rooted in pawnship. Under pawning 
arrangements, the collateral for credit was in the form of individuals, which 
usually required borrowers to lodge human pawns with shipmasters in 
exchange for trade goods provided on credit. Transactions were normally 
privately negotiated and enforced, though it was possible for ekpe to be 
invoked to protect the reputation of all traders from being damaged by 
default by a few. Redemption of pawns by traders was secured only on 
delivery within an agreed time of a specified number of slaves, but 
contested interpretations of contracts and fear of jeopardizing future 
relations by immediate foreclosure in the event of default could slow 
closure of transactions. Pawning subsequently became the principal element 
in credit protection arrangements at Cameroon and Gabon as Liverpool 
traders began to export slaves from these areas from the late 1750s.  
 The institutional adjustment in commercial and credit relations at 
Bonny and Old Calabar set the economic and political parameters of 
trade.21 As previously demonstrated, British and Old Calabar merchants 
mixed personal and commercial relations but nonetheless relied on 
‘commercial hostages’ as a means of alleviating the risks of advancing credit 
that allowed merchants at Old Calabar to send goods to interior markets. 
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While not unique to Old Calabar, pawnship thus underpinned and 
promoted the expansion of slave exports there. Those pawned included 
relatives of local traders and, for this reason, shipmasters were sometimes 
reluctant to foreclose on debts, preferring to adjust holdings of pawns 
among themselves rather than sailing away with them. Nevertheless, ships 
occasionally took away pawns as slaves when local dealers failed to meet 
their obligations within an agreed time, some dealers acknowledged their 
right to do so. In this respect, credit arrangements at Old Calabar were 
based on privately ordered, self-regulating contracts that had mutually 
accepted and recognized mechanisms of debt clearing that could involve 
enslavement of those held as security. 
 The mechanisms for regulating credit arrangements at both Bonny 
and Old Calabar facilitated trade and the willingness of British merchants to 
extend trade under two quite different credit protection regimes reveals the 
extent to which British merchants had to adjust to local conditions of trade. 
Both Bonny and Old Calabar promoted the slave trade and actively 
collaborated in its operation, but the forms of regulation set limits on the 
extent of involvement. Bonny emerged as more efficient in terms of rates of 
loading ships with slaves brought from the interior, which required 
extensive credit and mechanisms to assure that debts were honoured. 
Implicit in this ordering was a determination of who could trade in the 
interior and who could not. Europeans were not allowed beyond the port, 
and no mulatto population developed. At Old Calabar, the senior council of 
the ekpe society managed credit protection and safeguarded pawns held as 
collateral, but this mechanism of regulation was open to conflict, as revealed 
most clearly in the ‘massacre’ of the merchants of one ward (Old Town) at 
Old Calabar in 1767, and the inability to keep tolls and duties competitive 
with those at Bonny. Despite this assessment of relative success in 
participating in the slave trade, the contrast with the Muslim interior of 
West Africa is clear. Whereas the Muslim interior evinced a reluctance to 
engage with European trade in slaves, the flexibility in devising mechanisms 
for ordering trade in the Bight of Biafra, as elsewhere along the African 





The slave trade by its nature involved regulation. Enslaved individuals did 
not willingly travel or board ships. They had to be confined and guarded, 




which required organization and inevitably collaboration among merchants 
and officials involved in the trade. Slavery was a very specific social aspect 
of migration that highlights the choices and possibilities of individual 
migrants – or the lack of such choice on the part of the migrant. In the 
contrasting cases discussed here, the enslaved migrant population eventually 
adjusted to the final place of settlement, but where that was varied and was 
determined by others. Muslims could pursue policies that concentrated 
slaves in their own societies, governed by Islamic law and in accordance 
with Muslim views of slavery and assimilation. How the process of 
assimilation played itself out varied, but slaves largely ended up becoming 
Muslims. By contrast, slaves leaving the Bight of Biafra were consciously 
funnelled to the coast from a tight commercial network that developed 
specifically for the purpose of supplying the Atlantic slave trade. Inevitably, 
the fact that the migration was through coercion and slavery influenced 
whether or not individuals were assimilated and therefore the impact of 
immigration on the societies concerned.  
Enforced migration, as in the case of the slave trade, required specific 
structures of migration that were always heavily regulated, as has been 
demonstrated in the contrast between Muslim and non-Muslim areas of 
West Africa. Governments and enterprises regularly facilitated or restricted 
enforced migration by organising and regulating the sale of slaves. The 
explanations for governmental and entrepreneurial intervention were related 
to the desire to profit from the trade. In the case of the Muslim interior of 
West Africa, however, attitudes about the nature of Islamic society and the 
role of government in the enforcement of Islamic law mitigated against the 
sale of slaves to the Atlantic coast. Although not always effective, Muslim 
governments and Muslim commercial networks inhibited the sale of slaves 
to the coast. To some extent, therefore, it can be said that there were 
policies of restriction that impeded population relocation. These policies 
suggest an attempt at ‘social engineering’, in which deportation of enslaved 
populations was discouraged and the settlement of slaves in areas controlled 
by Muslims encouraged instead. Muslim governments and merchants were 
attempting to deploy human resources for economic purposes, albeit using 
slavery to do so, which inevitably was achieved through the suppression of 
dissent and the subjugation of dissident populations. By contrast, merchants 
at Bonny and Old Calabar openly participated in the expansion of the slave 
trade, which required self-regulating mechanisms to maximize access to 
credit, which was obtained from British merchants.  
 
